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IN THE SUPRE!,lE COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THURMAN DAVID HEABERLIN and
MARGIE HEABERLIN, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
CITY OF FUN CARNIVAL, a
partnership and LOUIS
HELENDEZ,
Defendants-Respondents,

Case No. 15,214

vs.
LOIS MELENDEZ,
Third Party
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondents agree with appellants statement of the
nature of the case.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Respondents disagree with the appellants statement of
the disposition in the lower court.
Plaintiffs-appellants filed this action nearly seven
years ago, on December 16, 1970, (R. 263-264) to determine
the existence of a partnership, to disolve the partnership,
and to have an accounting and distribution.

On January 3,

1972, slightly over a year later, defendants-respondents

fil(•d
Notice
of Funding
Readiness
Trial,
(R.
226)
to which
Sponsored their
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
for digitization to
provided
by the Institute
of Museum
and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-the plaintiffs-appellants objected.

(R.

224).

On April 28 ,

1972, defendants-respondents filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on the question of the terms of the partnership
and the validity of a written partnership agreement between
the parties.

(R. 216).

The Notion was expressly based on

the depositions of Thurman David Heaberlin, Hargie Heaberlin
and Louis Melendez, Jr.

On July 19, 1972, the trial court

denied the motion for summary judgment specifically because
the deposition of Margie Heaberlin had not been filed.

(R,

Thereafter, Margie Heaberlin's deposition was filed.

200).

A pre-trial conference was held on November 3, 1972.
(R.

197).

At that time the court bifurcated the trial, the

first phase was to be "What was the Partnership?" and the
second phase was to be the "Accounting".

(R. 197).

Pursuan:

to the pre-trial conference discussions, counsel for both
parties submitted supplemental authorities on defendantrespondents previous motion for summary judgment on the
issue of the partnership.

(R. 192, 194).

Oral arguments

were held on the motion for summary judgment on January 5,
1973.

(R.

188).

The trial court entered its order grantinj

summary judgment and ruled that the signed, written agreement between the parties,

(Deposition of Thurman David

Heaberlin, Exhibit 1) was and is the partnership agreement
between the parties on January 18, 1973.

(R. 187).

This

eliminated the need for the "first phase" of the two part
trial.
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Thereafter plaintiffs-appellants filed a Motion to
Alter and Amend Order and Judgment and a Motion for New
Trial on Order and Summary Judgment dated the 26th day of
January, 1973.

(R. 185).

Shortly thereafter, defendant-

respondent filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment on the
issue of dissolution and accounting.

(R. 138).

Plaintiffs-

Appellants Motion to alter and amend the judgment and for a
New Trial and Defendant-Respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment came on for oral argument together on the 13th day
of April, 1973, at which time both Motions were denied.

(R.

940).
On the 6th day of February, 1974, this matter came on
for what was to be the trial on the issue of accounting.
(R. 43).

The court decided, at that time, however, that a

master would be appointed to take evidence and to determine
the accounting and the dissolution of the partnership.
43).

(R.

Thereafter on the 1st day of March, 1977, defendant-

respondent renewed its Motion for Summary Judgment on the
issue of the accounting.

Oral arguments on the renewed

Motion were had on April 8, 1977.

(R. 24).

On April 15,

1977, the court entered its Order and Judgment granting
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in all respects and
granting defendants a judgment.

It is from that Order and

Judgment that plaintiff-appellant appeals.

(R. 16).
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RELIEF SOUGllT ON APPEAL
The respondents request this Court to affirm the judgments of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents disagree with the statement of facts as set
forth by appellant in certain 1"atters.

Before respondents se:

out the facts of the dealings of the parties with each
other, there is one statement of fact in appellants' brief
to which respondents believe they should first respond.
Appellants state on page 9 of their brief that Judge Joseph
E. Nelson signed a Restraining Order which was to restrain
the defendants from certain types of conduct.

Counsel for

appellants did in fact prepare and file a motion for such a
restraining order and did prepare a proposed restraining
order.

(R.

252-256).

However, contrary to the statement in

appellants' brief on page 9, Judge Nelson did not sign the
restraining order (R. 253) nor is there any return of servic:
in the record indicating that the defendants have ever been
served with any order, nor were the defendants ever in fact
served with any restraining order in this matter.

The

minute entry of the hearing on the t,lotion for the restrainir
order which was held February 5, 1971,
motion was denied.

(R. p.

inclicates that his

252).

Respondents make the following additions or correction'
to appellants statement regarding the dealings of the parll'
with each other.

l~hile,

as appellants state, appellants an:

respondents began \vorking together in the spring of 1964,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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t'

did not immediately enter into a specific oral partnership
agreement.

(Deposition of Lou Melendez, p. 18-24).

In

fact, as late as July of 1965, Mr. Heaberlin indicated in a
letter to Nr. Melendez that their arrangement was with "no
strings attached".

(Deposition of Lou Melendez, p. 26 Line

12 top. 27 Line 10).
Thereafter appellants and respondents began working on
a written agreement which appellants read and worked on
several times over a long period of time and which was signed
by all parties on April 18, 1967.

(Exhibit 1, Deposition of

Thurman David Heaberlin, p. 9-11, p. 28 Line 4-13; Deposition
of Lou Melendez p.

14, Line 19).

25-30; Deposition of Margie Heaberlin, p.

The agreement is set out in full in appellants

brief on Pages 5-8.
The partnership agreement entered into between appellants
(David and Margie Heaberlin) and respondent (Louis Melendez)
provides as follows regarding dissolution:

10. Dave, if he elects to leave the firm
will never be allowed to leave with any
piece of property except for the inventory
he filed at beginning of agreement and any
added to list by Lou bought personally by
Dave - all additions are to be signed for
by Lou.
12.
As carnival is efficient only in size
at no time will the unit ever be divided
for disolvement of partnership.
13.
Dave will be paid, in case if disolvement, price agreed upon or by am?unt of_
stock paid into corporation by h1m and 1n
no case more than the $25,000.00 agreed purchase price and in same time period as paid
for unless otherwise agreed upon.
(Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Exhibit
1).
Library Services
and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The partnership agreement provides that upon dissolution, appellants will get (l) Inventory of equipment
brought into partnership,

(2) Amount paid into partnership

but not more than $25,000.00.

When appellant left, he

to~

with him all of his personal property, the items in No, 1
above, a 1967 station wagon, a house trailer, and $l,lOO.OQ
which was paid to him by respondents at the meeting between
respondents and appellants and their respective attorneys,
(Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin, p. 18-21).
The only amount appellant had paid into the

partnersh~

pursuant to paragraph 8 and 13 was a credit of $776.50 as
l/2 of a check retained by Lou Melendez in the amount of
$1,553.00.

(Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin p. 13);

Deposition of Lou Melendez, p.

38 Lines 24-40, Line 22,

Affidavit of Lou Melendez, R. 37).

The cash paid appellant

just prior to his leaving, therefore, represented a payment
of the amount due to appellant under paragraphs 8 and 13,
plus an additional $323.50.
Respondents deny that appellants left the partnership
pursuant to a mutual termination as asserted in their brief
on Page 9.

The circumstances around appellants leaving are

as follows:
In In May of 1970, appellant David Heaberlin had an

arg~

ment with Lou Melendez, which Mr. Heaberlin describes as
"mostly my fault."
p. 17, Line 7).

(Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin,

A couple of weeks later t-lr. Heaberlin met

-6- by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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with his counsel, Mr. Taylor; the respondent, Mr. Melendez;
and respondents' counsel, Mr. Lewis.

It was agreed at that

meeting that Mr. Heaberlin would stay with the carnival and
some talk was had of a possible re-negotiation of the existing
partnership agreement.
p. 17 Line 19-22).
$1,100.00.

(Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin,

At that meeting Mr. Heaberlin was paid

(Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin p. 18,

Lines 7-14).

After the meeting, Mr. Heaberlin said he

"changed his mind and decided not to stay in the company."
(Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin, p. 18, Lines 17-18).
Mr. Heaberlin then took his own personal belongings, his
shop truck, a house trailer and a station wagon and, without
contacting Mr. Melendez, voluntarily left the business and
went to California.

(Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin,

p. 18-21).
POINT I
APPELLANTS ARE PRECLUDED FROM CONTESTING THE TRIAL
COURT'S ORDER OF SUMMARY

JUDG~IENT

DATED JANUARY 17, 1973,

BECAUSE OF THEIR FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAL
PURSUANT TO RULE 72(a).
The trial court bifurcated this matter for trial.
195).

(R.

The frist trial was to have determined "What was the

Partnership Agreement?" and the second trial was to have
determined an accounting of the dissolution of the partnership.

(R. 195).

court granted

Prior to the first trial, however, the

sum~ary

judgment ruling that the written

agreement between the parties (Deposition of Thurman David

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Haberlin, Exhibit 1) was the partnership agreement.
187).

(R.

Plaintiffs, recognizing that this was a final judg-

ment as to the issues of the.first scheduled trial, filed a
"Motion to Alter or Amend Order and Judgment and a Motion
for a New Trial on Order and Summary Judgment" and stated
therein that they were doing so pursuant to Rule 59 Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The trial court denied plain-

tiffs motions on April 18, 1975.

No notice of appeal was

filed pursuant to Rule 72(a) until April 28, 1977, more
than two years after the court entered its order denying
plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend the judgment or for a
new trial.
Rule 72(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
that:
An appeal may be taken to the Supreme
Court from all final orders and judgments in accordance with these rules;
provided, that when other claims remain to be determined in the proceedings, a party may preserve his right
to appeal on the decided issue until a
final determination of the other claims
by filing with the trial court and
serving on the adverse parties within
the time provided in Rule 73(a), a notice of his intention to do so.
Rule 73(a) provides that the time within which an appeal may
be taken is one month from the entry of the judgment.
Therefore, if plaintiffs had desired to preserve their right
to appeal on the j uclgment issued by the court on January 11,
1973, they would have had to have filed their Notice of
Intention to Appeal within one month from April 18, 1975.
Noby the
notice
intent
appeal
was
filed
within
that
Sponsored
S.J. Quinneyof
Law Library.
Funding to
for digitization
provided
by the Institute
of Museum
and Library
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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mo0th pe~iod, and, the~efo~e, this Cou~t does not have
ju~isdiction to review the trial court's Summary Judgment of

January 17, 1973.
The~e

stands.

are no cases interpreting this rule as it now

The cases presented herein all interpret the rule

prior to the last amendment by the Supreme Court.

The rule

was significantly amended on June 23, 1971, which was more
than six months prior to the court's entry of summary judgment herein and was approximately two years prior to the
court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.
The amendment added final "Orders" to final "Judgments"
from which on appeal could be taken and inserted the provision for preserving the right to appeal on a "decided
issue".

(See compiler's notes to Rule 72(a) 1975 Pocket

Supplement to Volume 9 Utah Code Annotated 1953).
Prior to this amendment, the Supreme Court had been
extremely reluctant to find many types of orders and judgments to be final orders from which an appeal would lie.
With this amendment, however, the court broadened the application of Rule 72 to not only final judgments disposing of
the entire case but also to orders and judgments which
finally decide a particular issue while not determining all
claims set forth in a particular case.
The Supreme Court, by its amendment, established the
procedure by which a party could preserve his right to
appeal on any such decided issue until the final determination of all the other issues and claims.

Such a procedure

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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seems to specifically cover the situation involved herein.
In this matter, the trial court bifurcated the issues and
scheduled two separate trials.

The granting of the summary

judgment disposed of the issues of the first trial and left
only the issue of an accounting of the dissolution of the
partnership.

Such an order of summary judgment fits clearly

within the definition of "final orders and judgment" as
contemplated by Rule 7 2 (a) as amended.

There fore, by their

failure to preserve their right to appeal that judgment, they
are precluded from appealinq that decision at this time.
Even prior to the 1971 amendment expanding the types of
orders from which one must file a notice of appeal in order
to preserve his right to appeal, this Court has held that a
judgment which leaves only the matter of an accounting

to~

determined is a final order from which an appeal lies.
Wheelright v. Roman,

50 Utah 10, 165 P. 513 (1917).

While

respondents concede that the facts of that case are not
identical with the instant case, respondents cite the case
for the proposition that the fact that an accounting

remain~

to be made did not stop a judgment from being considered
final.
One case which was decided prior to the amendment of
the rule which clearly states the spirit of the rule and the
position which respondents take herein,
Hayward v. Voorhees, 12 Utah 2d 361,

is the case of

366 P.2d 977 (1961).

The court therein stated:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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Respondents raise an issue as to the
timeline3s of the appeal from the decree
of October 2, 1959.
It must be conceded that if the decree was appealable
at the time of its entry, no appeal was
taken within the one month allowed by
Rule 73{a), U.R.C.P.
The appellants
assert that it was not then final and
therfore, not appealable because of the
proviso that the court retained jurisdiction "for the purpose of adjudicating
any matter which may arise under the memorandum pending the final creation of the
trust". They point to the fact that there
has been no formal setting up of the
trust.
It is appreciated that because
of the factor just mentioned and that
the two proceedings, the probate and the
civil suit, were involved, there may be
some justification for uncertainty as to
the status of that judgment.
However,
cutting through the brush of the attempted procedural forensics, it will be
seen that the real issue between the
parties and before the court was whether
the mountain ground belonged to Mrs.
Voorhees or to the estate.
Upon preliminary hearing thereon, the issue was
resolved against her.
The fact that the
court retained jurisdiction as mentioned
above to adjudicate further matters, did
not leave open for reconsideration the
question as to who owned that property.
There was nothing further to be decided
on that particular issue and she was
ordered to transfer it to the estate. At
being so, the decree entered thereon was
final and therefore appealable.
Since
she took no appeal within the time allowed
by law, that decree is conclusive.
(12
Utah 2d at 366).
(Emphasis added).
In the instant matter, the primary determination was
the terms of the partnership.

After the determination of

the terms of the partnership it is essentially a mechanical
]rocess to account for the dissolution of the partnership
und0r whatever terms are deterMined.

Once the court had

3rant0d summary judgment establishing that the written
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-11Library Services and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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agreement between the parties was in fact the partnership
agreement, there was nothing further to be decided on that
central issue.

Nov1

that the rule has been expanded to in-

clude orders and judgments which dispose of one issue rather
than all issues, certainly a summary judgment which left
only an accounting and determined the terms of the partnership is an order or judgment within the contemplation of
this rule.

The order and judgment entered January 18, 1973,

was therefore a final order or judgment within the meaning
of Rule 72(a) and because appellants failed to preserve
their right to appeal by failing to file a notice of intent
to appeal within the time allowed by law,

that order is

conclusive on the matter of the terms of the partnership.

POINT II
EVEN IF THIS COURT HOLDS THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FIRST
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT
FOR REVIEW, THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER
AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED.
The partnership, the terms of which are in dispute
herein, was entered into sometime after the Spring of 1964,
nearly 14 years ago, and was disolved in 1970, nearly eight
years ago.

This is the very type of situation contemplated

by the development of the concepts behind the Statute of
Frauds, the parol evidence rule and the best evidence rule.
Men's memories go dim or fail completely or are influenced
by their prejudices and desires.

In such a situation whet-
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a!'

signed,

it is the wise policy of the courts to use the

written agreement to ~easure the rights and liabilities of
the parties.

59 Am.Jur.2d, Partnership, Section 33.

After Mr. Heaberlin and Mr. Melendez began working
together, a partnership agreement was drafted to state the
rights and obligations of each in preparation to forming a
corporation.

This was negotiated and prepared over a long

period of time and was finally signed April 18, 1967.
(Exhibit l, Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin p. 9, 10,
11, 28 L. 4-13; Louis 11elendez deposition p. 25-30).

The

document was read by Mr. Heaberlin several times over a long
period of time and several corrections were made at his
insistance.

(Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin, p. 11,

Deposition of Louis Melendez, p. 26-29, Deposition of Margie
Heaberlin, Exhibits land 2).

Finally on April 18, 1967,

the agreement was signed by Thurman David Heaberlin (Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin p. 11, Line 4, 20), Louis
l·lelendez.

(Deposition of Louis Melendez, p. 28 Line 20),

and Margie Heaberlin.

(Deposition of Margie Heaberlin p. 14

Linel9).
There is no contention that any other writing was ever
entered into that modified the written agreement of April
18, 1967, nor is there any contention that it was cancelled,
rescinded or revoked prior to its disolution by plaintiffs'
voluntary leaving the business in 1970.
59 Am.Jur.2d Partnership Section 33 states "while a
written agreement is not necessary, where it does exist it

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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constitutes the measure of the partners rights and liabilities".

Section

76 of the same article states that, as

to proof of the terms of the partnership, "the best evidence
consists of the agreement or contract between the parties".
Section 76 further states that only when no

~1riting

is

available does one turn to the transactions, conduct and
declarations of the parties.

Section 37 also adds:

The general principle that when the
parties to a contract have reduced the
terms to writing in unambiguous terms,
parol evidence will not be received to
substitute a new contract, applies to
partnership agreements.
Appellants contentions that there are material facts
which are still in issue ignore the law and the facts herein,
The material facts appellant contends are still in issue
are:
A.

Was there an oral partnership agreement

between the parties?
B.

Did the pre-incorporation agreement modify the

oral partnership agreement?

c.

What were the terms of the partnership

agreement?
Questions A and B, are answered by the Parol Evidence
Rule.

The rule and its rationale are set out in 30 Am.Jur.2:

Evidence, Section 1016:
The well established general rule is that
where the parties to a contract have
deliberately put their engagement in
writing in such ter::1s as import a legal
obligation without any uncertainty as
to the object or extent of such engageSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-14Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ment, it is conclusively presumed that
the entire engagement of the parties,
and the extent and manner of their undertaking, have been reduced to writing, and
all oarol evidence of prior or contempGr=
aneoue conversations or declarations tending to substitute a new and different
co~t:act.for the one evidenced by the
wr1t1ng 1s Incompetent.
Stated otherwise,
the intention of the parties as evidenced
by the legal import of the language of a
valid written contract cannot ordinarily
be varied by parol proof of a different
intention . •
The parol evidence rule is founded upon
the principle that when the parties have
discussed and agreed upon their obligations to each other and reduced those
terms to writing, the writing, if clear
and unambiguous, furnishes better and
more definite evidence of what was undertaken by each party than the memory of man,
and applies to exclude extrinsic utterances
when it is sought to use those utterances
for the purpose for which the writing was
made, such writing superseding them as the
legal act.
The instrument itself is regarded as the best evidence of what the
parties intended, and the writing still
remains the best evidence of the understanding of the parties, even though,
through a defect of form or by reason of
some positive provision of law, it cannot
have the effect intended for it. No other
language is admissible to show what the
parties meant or intended, for the reason
that each has made the instrument the
agreed test of his meaning and intention.
The rule rests upon a rationale foundation
of experience and policy and is essential
to the certainty and stability of written
obligations.
It is designed to permit a
party to a written contract to protect himself against perjury, infirmity of memory,
or the death of witnesses.
(Emphasis
added) .
See also Stanley v. Deseret Foods Corp., 93 Utah 577, 74
P.2d 1221 (1938) and Andrus v. Blazzard, 23 Utah 233, 63 P.
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The very things appellant says are issues of fact- i.e.
the prior oral arrangements and their terms - are the very
things the rule is designed to exclude.
The third issue of fact the appellants point to, i.e.
"what are the terms of the partnership agreement?" is
answered:

The written document speaks for itself.

The

Court's first summary judgment simply said the terms of the
partnership was the written agreement.

The interpretation

and application of those terms was left to the balance of
the determination in the second summary judgment and are
discussed in Point III hereof, and was not material to that
motion

for summary judgment.

The trial court properly entered judgment that the
written agreement entered into by appellants and respondent
which set out the terms for operating and r1isolving the
partnership would be the measure of the rights and liabilities of these parties.

Such action is clearly supportec

by the law as set out above.
POINT III
THE TERMS OF THE WRITTEN PARTNERSHIP ARE CLEAR AS TO
DISSOLUTION.

THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUt-lt1IARY JUDGIIENT I'

ACCORDANCE WITH THOSE TERMS.
In May of 1970, appellant David Heaberlin had an argument with Lou Melendez, which Mr. Heaberlin describes as
"mostly my fault."
p. 17 Line 7).

(Deposition of Thurr:1an David Heaberlin,

A couple of weeks later ~lr. Heaberlin met

with his counsel, t,lr. Taylor; the rE'sponnrnt, ~lr. ~lelendez'
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and respondents' counsel, Mr. Lewis.

It was agreed at that

meeting that Mr. Heaberlin would stay with the carnival and
some talk was had of a possible re-negotiation of the existing
partnership agreement.
lin, p. 17 Line 19-22).
paid $1,100.00.
18, Lines 7-14).

(Deposition of Thurman David HeaberAt that meeting Mr. Heaberlin was

(Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin p.
After the meeting, Mr. Heaberlin said he

"changed his mind and decided not to stay in the company."
(Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin, p. 18, Lines 17-18).
Mr. Heaberlin then took his own personal belongings, his
shop truck, a house trailer and a station wagon and, without
contacting Mr. Melendez, voluntarily left the business and
went to California.
p. 18-21).

(Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin,

Mr. Heaberlin was not forced out of the business,

nor was there any mutual agreement made as to termination as
claimed in appellants brief.

Appellants own testimony

indicates that appellants, after a meeting where he agreed
to stay with the carnival, changed his mind and voluntarily
left of his own accord.
The partnership agreement entered into between appellants
(David and Margie Heaberlin) and respondent (Louis Melendez)
provides as follows regarding dissolution:
10.
Dave, if he elects to leave the firm
will never be allowed to leave with any
piece of property except for the inventory
he filed at beginning of agreement and any
added to list by Lou bought personally by
Dave - all additions are to be signed for
by Lou.
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12. As carnival is efficient only in size
at no time will the unit ever be divided
for disolvement of partnership.
13.
Dave will be paid, in case if disolvement, price agreed upon or by amount of
stock paid into corporation by him and in
no case more than the $25,000.00 agreed purchase price and in sa~e time period as paid
for unless otherwise agreed upon.
(Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin,
Exhibit 1).
The partnership agreement provides that upon dissolution, appellants will get (1) Inventory of equipment
brought into partnership;

(2) Amount paid into partnership

but not more than $25,000.00.

When appellant left, he took

with him all of his personal property, the items in No. 1
and 2 above, a 1967 station wagon, a house trailer, and
$1,100.00 which was paid to him by respondents at the
meeting between respondents and appellants and their respective attorneys.

(Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin, p.

18-21).
The only amount appellant had paid into the

partnersh~

pursuant to paragraph 8 and 13 was a credit of $776.50 as
1/2 of a check retained by Lou Melendez in the amount of
$1,553.00.

(Deposition of Thurman David Heaberlin p. 13;

Deposition of Lou Melendez, p. 38 Lines 24-40, Line 22,
Affidabit of Lou Helendez, R. 37).

The cash paid appellant

just prior to his leaving, therefore, represented a payment
of the amount due to appellant under paragraphs 8 and 13,
plus an additional $323.50.
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When the court held the hearing on this matter February
6, 1974, after it had granted summary judgment on the issue
of the partnership agreement, these facts were not yet
clearly in the mind of the Court.
hearing, R. 270-298).

(See transcript of the

As the nature of appellants claim at

that point was dissolution and accounting according to the
terms of the partnership agreement, the court decided not to
go into the facts of the matter at that time.
The court decided instead to appoint a master.

(R. 292).
When the

name of a master suitable to both parties was agreed upon,
the court indicated it would prepare an order for the master
and then refer the matter to the master.

(R. 292-294).

Thereafter, on March 1, 1977, respondents prepared a
motion for summary judgment on the issue of the accounting
and dissolution and supported it with the affidavit of Lou
Melendez.

(R. 31-42).

Respondent's affidavit stated with

particularity the items and monies that were due and that
had been distributed and that all that was due had been
distributed.

In responding to respondent's motion for

summary judgment, appellants filed no counter affidavit
contesting the facts set forth in respondents affidavit.
Appellants merely attached copies of earlier affidavits
dated January 24, 1973, which dealt with the issue of the
terms of the partnership agreement and which had been submitted in opposition to respondent's earlier motion for
summary judgment on the issue of the partnership.

(R. 31).
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With no counter affidavits contesting the facts regarding dissolution and distribution as set forth in respondents affidavits, the facts as stated therein are uncontroverted facts.

The purpose of a mot ion for summary judgmen:

is to go beyond the pleadings or the mere allegations of
the parties to determine what evidence is available and
which issues are in fact contested.

Mere allegations will

not withstand a motion for summary judgment.

See Menlove v.

Salt Lake County, 18 Utah 2d 203, 418 P.2d 227, {1966);
Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 {1960).
On the basis of these facts now clearly presented to
the Court, the Court could rightly conclude the following:
1)

No master was necessary;

2) the terms of the

partnersh~

agreement specifically stated that the assets of the

partne~

ship were not to be divided but were to remain with the

Ci~

of Fun Carnival and that appellant was to take his personal
property only and was to be paid what ever he had actually
paid in pursuant to the agreement;

3) that appellants had

paid in $776.50; 4) that appellant had been paid $1,100.00
and had taken the property to which he had been entitled, all
as outlined in the uncontroverted affidavit of respondents.

(R. 31-42).

Summary judgment was, therefore, the appro-

priate remedy for respondent.
Appellant, in Point III of his brief, argues that theR
were three genuine issues of fact which should have prevente
the court from granting summary judgment.

They are:
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A.
THE LOWER COURT RULED THAT THERE WAS A
PARTNERSHIP AND ORDERED AN ACCOUNTING.
B.

WHAT \'lAS THE VALUE OF THE PARTNERSHIP?

C.

WHAT WERE THE TERMS OF THE DISSOLUTION?

None of these three presents a genuine issue of fact.
A. - The lower court did rule on the issue of the
partnership pursuant to Rule 56(d) which left the question
of the accounting to be determined.

The court, as explained

above, was going to appoint a master to take evidence and
report back to the court.

When the facts of the case relating

to the accounting were presented upon respondents motion for
summary judgment, however, the court rightly concluded that
a master would not be necessary.

Appellants cite no authority

because there is no authority stating that once the court
has granted summary judgment on one issue, that it cannot
later grant summary judgment on some or all other issues if
the facts and the law warrant it.
B. - The value of the partnership assets does not enter
into the dissolution of the partnership according to the terms
of the partnership agreement entered into by appellants and
respondents.

The terms of the partnership agreement state

that Heaberlin will not take any of the assets with him but
that he will be paid what he has actually paid in.

The

uncontroverted facts in respondent's affidavit and according
to the depositions of appellant as set forth above, is that
the only amount paid in by appellants was more than paid
back to him on dissolution.

~he

value of the partnerships,
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therefore, was not material to the dissolution under the
terms of the agreement.
C. - The terms of the dissolution were set forth in the
partnership agreement and the actions of the parties upon
dissolution were set out in respondents affidavit and uncontested by appellant.
The trial court was therefore correct in granting
summary judgment on the sole remaining issue of the
accounting, dissolution and distribution and respondent
urges this Court to affirm that judgment.
In responding to Point V which also goes to the issue
of the second summary judgment entered by the court, respondent asserts that appellant is misreading the rule.

The

only facts "established" by a partial summary judgments

a~

those facts the court finds at that time to be without
substantial controversy.

All remaining issues are to be the

subject of further proceeding.

In his first motion for

summary judgment (R. 216) respondent specifically asked that
the issue of the written partnership agreement be decided.
This is all that the court considered and all
decided.

that the court

Certainly, this cannot be said to preclude the

court from later deciding any other issue properly present~
to the court.
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CONCLUSION
By the nature of the proceedings in the lower court,
this matter is divided into two issues:

1) the terms of the

partnership as determined in the trial court's first summary
judgment, and 2) the dissolution and distribution according
to those terms in the trial court's second summary judgment.
As to the first summary judgment, appellants failed to
preserve their right to appeal and have waived any objections they now attempt to assert.

Even if this Court con-

eludes, however, that the first summary judgment is reviewable
at this time, the trial court's action is fully supported by
the law and the facts and should be sustained.
As to the second summary judgment, the law, as outlined
herein, and the uncontroverted facts as outlined in respondents affidavit fully support the trial court's judgment.
This litigation which has been in the courts for nearly
eight years should now properly be brought to a close by
affirming the trial court's actions~ein.
Respectfully submitted this

6-

day of October, 1977.

__

/

,

b~L4
;

~~x-'-'LEW.IS,

1
for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for Respondent
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